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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Koch appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing
his post-conviction petition.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Koch on four counts of lewd conduct with a minor.
See State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 92, 334 P.3d 280, 283 (2014). After the trial,
the jury found Koch guilty on all four counts. See id. at 93, 334 P.3d at 284. The
district court imposed concurrent unified 25-year sentences with five years fixed
on each count. Id. Koch raised numerous allegations of evidentiary error on
direct appeal, but the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. See id. at
93-105, 334 P.3d at 284-296.
Koch then filed a pro se post-conviction petition. (R., pp.3-11.) In the
petition, Koch asserted his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to prepare
any defense; (2) failing to utilize any expert witnesses at the trial; (3) failing to
allow Koch to read the grand jury transcript and other documents associated with
the case; (4) failing to challenge the validity of a search warrant utilized by police
during the underlying criminal investigation; and (5) filing an “inadequate” I.C.R.
35 motion. (Id.) The district court declined to appoint counsel to represent Koch
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in the proceeding because Koch failed to present any evidence regarding his
indigence, or to raise the possibility of a valid claim.1 (R., pp.345-349.)
The state filed a motion for summary dismissal of the petition on the
ground that Koch’s claims were bare, conclusory, and failed to allege facts,
which, if true, demonstrated that he was entitled to relief. (R., pp.15-16, 336344.) Specifically, the state argued that Koch failed to: (1) explain what defense
or specific evidence his attorney should have presented that would have
changed the outcome of the trial; (2) explain what type of expert testimony his
attorney should have presented that would have changed the outcome of the
trial; (3) identify which case documents counsel failed to let him read, or explain
how being able to read these documents or the grand jury transcript would have
changed the outcome of the trial; and (4) allege facts demonstrating that a
motion to suppress the search warrant would have been successful. (Id.) The
state also submitted copies of transcripts from the underlying trial, pretrial
hearings, and sentencing hearing into the post-conviction record. (R., pp.17335.)
At a hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Koch attempted
to clarify his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the search warrant.
Koch alleged that the officers executed the search warrant at his house ten days
before the date listed on the actual search warrant, and that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge this alleged deficiency with a motion to
1

While the district court’s order indicated that it was denying Koch’s motion for
appointment of counsel, no such motion appears in the record, and Koch
expressly declined to request the appointment of counsel in his post-conviction
petition. (See R., p.5.)
2

suppress. (Tr., p.6, L.10 – p.10, L.24.) Koch did not submit the warrant itself, or
any sworn affidavit regarding the warrant, into evidence.
After providing notice (R., pp.353-361), the district court summarily
dismissed the petition on substantially the same grounds as set forth in both its
notice and in the state’s motion for summary dismissal – that each of Koch’s
claims were bare, conclusory, and unsupported by admissible evidence
(R., pp.363-373). Koch timely appealed. (R., pp.374-376.)
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ISSUE
Koch states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing the
petition for post-conviction relief[.]
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Koch failed to show that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition?

4

ARGUMENT
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Summarily
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Koch contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his

post-conviction petition. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-17.) Specifically, Koch contends:
(1) he did not receive the required 20 days’ notice to respond to the district
court’s notice of intent to dismiss; and (2) he raised a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the validity of the search warrant with a motion to suppress. (Id.)
A review of the record reveals that both claims fail. First, because the
district court summarily dismissed Koch’s petition on substantially the same
grounds as set forth in the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Koch was only
entitled to 20 days’ notice from the state’s motion, which he received. Further,
and in any event, the district court summarily dismissed the petition more than 20
days after its own notice of intent to dismiss. Second, Koch failed to allege facts
which, if true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claim regarding the search warrant.
B.

Standard of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
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affidavits on file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).
C.

Koch Received Adequate Notice Before The District Court Summarily
Dismissed His Post-Conviction Petition
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a post-conviction

petition on the trial court’s own initiative or in response to a party’s motion.
Where the district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition on its own
initiative, a petitioner is entitled to notice of the basis for the dismissal, and 20
days to respond. I.C. § 19-4906(b). However, where the district court grants a
party’s motion for summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), the motion
itself serves as the notice, and no additional notice from the court of the dismissal
is necessary.

Workman, 144 Idaho at 523-524, 164 P.3d at 803-804 (citing

Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995)); see also
Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d 123, 126 (Ct. App. 2009). In such a
scenario, a petitioner is instead entitled to 20 days’ notice from the state’s motion
for summary dismissal before his petition can be dismissed by the court.
See Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322, 900 P.3d at 798 (citing State v.
Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 488, 632 P.2d 676, 677 (1981)).
In this case, the state filed its motion for summary dismissal of Koch’s
post-conviction petition on September 28, 2015. (R., pp.15-16, 336-344.) The
district court entered its conditional dismissal order which provided notice of its
intent to summarily dismiss the petition on October 27, 2015. (R., pp.353-361.)
This notice was mailed to Koch one day later, on October 28, 2015. (R., p.361.)
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The court conducted a hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal on
November 16, 2015. (R., p.362; see also Tr.2) The court summarily dismissed
Koch’s petition on November 20, 2015, 53 days after the state filed its motion for
summary dismissal, and 24 days after the court entered its own notice of intent to
summarily dismiss the petition. (R., pp.363-373.) Koch thus had more than 20
days’ notice of the dismissal from both the date the state filed its motion for
summary dismissal, and the date the district court filed its notice of intent to
dismiss.
In its order summarily dismissing the post-conviction petition, the district
court stated that it had provided notice for the dismissal “because it considered
other grounds as well as those posited by the state.” (R., p.363.) However, a
review of the state’s motion and the district court’s dismissal order reveal that
while the court cited some cases not relied by upon the state, the court and the
state utilized substantially the same grounds – that each of Koch’s claims were
bare, conclusory, and unsupported by admissible evidence.

(Compare

R., pp.336-344 with pp.363-370.)
Both the state (R., pp.337-339), and the district court (R., pp.365-368),
cited caselaw standing for the general propositions that when a post-conviction
petitioner alleges facts, which, if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, the
district court may summarily dismiss the petition; and that bare or conclusory
allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a post2

The index page of the transcript indicates that the hearing was conducted on
November 11, 2015. (Tr., index.) However, the transcript heading and the clerk’s
record confirm that the hearing was conducted on November 16, 2015. (Tr., p.5,
L.1; R., pp.2, 362.)
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conviction petitioner to an evidentiary hearing.

Likewise, both the state

(R., pp.339-340), and the district court (R., p.367), cited Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), and other cases analyzing the standards applicable to
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. With respect to Koch’s specific
post-conviction claims, the state argued, in relevant part:
A.

Preparation and Presentation of a Defense

Koch has claimed he is entitled to relief because his attorney
failed to prepare or present “any” defense. Koch’s claim should be
dismissed, because it is bare and conclusory. Koch has failed to
explain what defense or specific evidence his attorney should have
presented that would have changed the outcome of the trial.
Koch’s claim is bare and conclusory because he is merely
concluding his attorney did not prepare or present a defense
without providing any facts to support his conclusion.
Also, Koch’s claim should be dismissed because it is
contrary to the record in the case. Counsel’s chosen strategy to
defend Koch was to argue the State could not meet its burden of
proof or prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The
defense was consistent throughout the trial in alleging the victim’s
accusations against Koch were false.
…
The court must dismiss this claim and it is bare and
conclusory and contrary to the record.
B.

Expert Testimony

Koch has claimed his attorney was ineffective for “failing to
present expert testimony” in his defense. Koch’s claim should be
dismissed, because it is bare and conclusory. Koch has failed to
explain what type of expert testimony his attorney should have
presented or an affidavit from the expert as to what the expert
would have testified. Koch has failed to state a claim because the
court has no way of determining what expert testimony Koch claims
his attorney failed to present and how such unidentified testimony
would have changed the outcome of his trial.
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C.

Reading Discovery & Grand Jury Transcript

Koch has claimed his attorney was ineffective for “failing to
allow him to read discovery and the grand jury transcript”. Koch’s
claim should be dismissed, because it is bare and conclusory.
Koch has put respondent and the court in the position where they
have to guess what specific discovery Koch was not allowed to
read and how being allowed to read it would have changed the
outcome of his trial. Koch has also failed to identify what prejudice
he suffered because he was not permitted to read the grand jury
transcript. Koch’s claim is bare and conclusory because the court
has no way of determining if Koch had read the discovery or
transcript, would have affected the outcome of the trial and
therefore has failed to state a claim.
D.

Motion to Suppress

Koch has claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to
file a motion to suppress the “search warrant” in the case. For the
purposes of this motion, the State will assume Koch is claiming his
attorney should have sought to suppress the photos and texts
seized during the search of his cell phone pursuant to a warrant.
Where the alleged deficiency is counsel’s failure to file a motion, a
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been
granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs
of the Strickland test. [Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 477-78, 180 P.3d at
516-17.
The court must dismiss this claim because it is bare and
conclusory. Koch has failed to articulate and identify why the
warrant would have been suppressed and how that would have
affected the outcome of the trial.
(R., pp.340-343 (bold in headings omitted, other emphasis and punctuation in
original).)
The district court similarly analyzed Koch’s ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims as follows:
In this case, Koch never filed any affidavits creating a factual
issue material to the Court’s decision. He also did not submit any
admissible evidence, or any evidence at all, in support of his
contentions. The Court is not required to accept his conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or his
9

conclusions of law. However, to the extent his factual allegations
are not conclusory, that he did not read his discovery, the Court
assumed it true for the purposes of this [d]ecision. It is against this
backdrop that the Court analyzes Koch’s claims.
In this case, Koch never presented any evidence to support
these claims. For example, Koch claims his trial counsel was
ineffective because he “failed to prepare or present any defense.”
However, Koch does not identify what defense, other than the
defense of “I did not do it,” his trial counsel could have presented.
In fact, he presented the defense that he did not do it at trial and
the jury did not believe him.
Koch claims his trial counsel failed to “present expert
testimony.” However, Koch does not identify what expert testimony
should have been presented or how it could have changed the
result.
Likewise, Koch claims his trial counsel failed to file [an]
“adequate Rule 35 motion to reconsider” but does not present what
evidence or argument he should have filed that would have
changed the outcome.
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact,
are inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing, and
the Court is not required to accept a petitioner’s mere conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or his
conclusions of law. Koch’s own statements are conclusory and do
not meet the threshold requirements to support his application. In
addition, contrary to Koch’s claim, defense counsel is not required
to raise every conceivable issue. Idaho appellate courts will not
second guess strategic and tactical decisions of trial counsel
whether to pursue a particular issue or theory, unless there is
“evidence that the decision was the result of inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective evaluation.” In his post-conviction Petition, Koch fails to
identify how the result would have changed. The evidence against
Koch was solid.
Koch also claims ineffective assistance of counsel because
his counsel failed to file a motion to suppress. (While he repeatedly
stated at the oral argument he was not suggesting a suppression
motion should have been filed, in reality that is what he is arguing.)
In cases like this, where the asserted deficiency on the part of
counsel consists of a failure to pursue a particular issue, which
even if pursued would not have afforded a basis for relief, the Court
10

will reject any ineffective assistance of counsel claim. While, Koch
introduced no evidence to support his claims, the Court carefully
reviewed the record in underlying case by reviewing the trial
transcript and finds that even if his attorney had filed a motion to
suppress, he would have been unsuccessful. He identified no
suppression issues in his Petition. He also failed to provide a copy
of the search warrant. A party moving to suppress evidence has
the threshold burden of showing that his legitimate privacy interests
have been infringed. Not only has Koch failed to identify any basis
to suppress the evidence found as a result of the search warrant,
Koch has simply not established that the outcome of the court
proceeding would have been different.
All of his other claims suffer from the same defect.
Therefore, the Court dismisses these claims.
(R., pp.368-370 (citations omitted, underline in original).)
The district court relied on substantially the same grounds as set forth by
the state in summarily dismissing Koch’s post-conviction. Both the court and the
state recognized that Koch’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were
bare, conclusory, and unsupported by admissible evidence.

Therefore, the

state’s motion itself provided adequate notice of the court’s dismissal of Koch’s
petition.3
In the alternative, even if the district court relied on grounds different than
those set forth by the state in summarily dismissing Koch’s petition, the district
court’s notice of intent to dismiss, filed 24 days prior to the entry of the court’s
dismissal order, provided adequate notice of the grounds for dismissal.
3

In its dismissal order, the district court also provided an alternate ground for
dismissal – that any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but
was not, was waived and could not be considered in the post-conviction
proceeding. (R., p.359.) The court did not identify which of Koch’s postconviction claims were subject to this alternate ground. Because each of Koch’s
post-conviction claims were expressly and independently dismissed on
substantially similar grounds as set forth by the state, Koch was not entitled to
additional notice of this alternate ground.
11

On appeal, Koch notes that the district court conducted a hearing on the
state’s motion for summary dismissal on November 16, 2015, 19 days after the
court mailed the notice of intent to dismiss on October 28, 2015.4 (Appellant’s
brief, pp.12-14.) At this hearing, Koch further notes, the court did not tell Koch
that he had more time to respond to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss, and
instead stated at the end of the hearing that it would take the matter under
advisement and would issue a written decision. (Appellant’s brief, p.14.) Given
this, Koch argues, “it would not be reasonable for a petitioner to believe that he
still had a chance to respond even assuming arguendo that the court would
accept further response.” (Id.) Essentially, Koch thus argues that the hearing on
the state’s motion for summary dismissal prematurely ended his opportunity to
respond to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss short of the required 20 days.
Koch’s argument fails. The court was under no duty to inform Koch of the
§ 19-4906 notice requirements, or specifically, whether Koch still had the
opportunity to respond to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss after the hearing
was completed. See Kootenai County v. Harriman-Sayler, 154 Idaho 13, 17, 293
P.3d 637, 641 (2012) (“Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules
as those represented by an attorney.”) (citations and quotations omitted). The
court did not misstate the law or otherwise mislead Koch. Further, there is no
indication in the record that Koch intended to respond to the notice of intent to
dismiss in some manner other than the argument he presented at the hearing,

4

Koch further argues that, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 2.2(c), he was entitled to three
additional days after the notice was mailed before he was required to respond.
(Appellant’s brief, p.14.)
12

but was somehow precluded from doing so by the district court.

Therefore,

because the district court entered its notice of intent to dismiss on October 27,
2015, and entered its dismissal order on November 20, 2015, Koch had
adequate notice of the dismissal, even assuming that the state’s motion for
summary dismissal itself did not provide adequate notice.
The district court summarily dismissed Koch’s post-conviction petition on
substantially the same grounds as set forth in the state’s motion for summary
dismissal. Therefore, the district court was not required to provide additional
notice before it summarily dismissed Koch’s petition. In the alternative, even if
the district court’s summary dismissal constituted a sua sponte dismissal on its
own motion, the court provided adequate notice of this dismissal through its
notice of intent to dismiss.
D.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Koch’s Claim That His Trial Counsel
Was Ineffective For Failing To Challenge The Search Warrant With A
Motion To Suppress
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.

A petition for post-conviction relief

initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522,
164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550
(1983).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own
initiative, if the applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case
13

as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the
burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190
(1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

Strickland,

466 U. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307
(1989). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174,
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 245 (Ct. App.
1999).
A trial attorney’s decision not to file a motion to suppress is not ineffective
assistance of counsel per se. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986).
Counsel will be found deficient for failure to file a suppression motion only when it
is shown that such a motion would have had a reasonable probability of success.
Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 866, 908 P.2d 162, 168 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing
Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158-159, 857 P.2d 634, 637-638 (Ct. App. 1993)).
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In his post-conviction petition in this case, Koch asserted that his trial
counsel failed to challenge the validity of the search warrant utilized by police
officers in the underlying criminal investigation.

(R., pp.3-11.)

Koch did not

submit the search warrant itself as an exhibit in the post-conviction proceeding,
nor did he allege any particular problem with the warrant that allegedly rendered
it invalid. (See id.) Koch also failed to allege any objective deficiency which led
to trial counsel’s decision not to challenge the warrant, or that he was prejudiced
by trial counsel’s decision. (See id.) Koch did not attempt to cure these defects
with an affidavit or proposed amended petition in response to either the state’s
motion for summary dismissal, or the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss.
At the hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Koch
attempted to clarify his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. (Tr., p.6, L.10
– p.10, L.24.) There, in unsworn statements, Koch alleged that the date on the
search warrant indicated that it was issued 10 days after it was actually served
and executed at his residence.5

(Id.)

Such unsworn statements are not

admissible evidence. I.R.E. 801, 802; Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 909, 894
P.2d 134, 142 (Ct. App. 1995) (court must accept verified allegations of fact).
Koch’s statements made at the hearing regarding the validity of the search
warrant did not save his ineffective assistance of counsel claim from summary

5

Because it was not entered as an exhibit in the post-conviction proceeding, the
search warrant itself is not a part of the appellate record in this case. However, it
is likely that the date Koch observed on the warrant indicates that the warrant
was returned to the court 10 days after it was executed (see I.C. §§ 19-4412, 194415), and not, as Koch appeared to imply at the hearing, that the officers and/or
the court attempted to retroactively legitimize a warrantless search of his
residence by obtaining a warrant after-the-fact of the search.
15

dismissal. Koch failed to support his unsworn assertions with any admissible
evidence. Further, his assertions are belied by the record. At the jury trial, the
transcript of which was submitted into evidence by the state in the postconviction proceeding, numerous police officers presented sworn testimony
regarding their search of Koch’s residence conducted pursuant to an existing
search warrant. (R., pp.160-175, 214-215, 220-223.)
On appeal, Koch contends that because the state did not produce
evidence to dispute his allegation regarding the warrant, the district court should
have assumed the truth of the allegation and ordered that an evidentiary hearing
be conducted on the issue. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-17.) However, as discussed
above, and as the district court recognized in this case, a court is not required to
accept a post-conviction petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence.

Ferrier, 135 Idaho at 799, 25 P.3d at 112; Roman,

125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.
Koch has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
the search warrant with a motion to suppress. This Court should therefore affirm
the district court’s order summarily dismissing Koch’s post-conviction petition.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
summary dismissal of Koch’s post-conviction petition.
DATED this 21st day of September, 2016.

_/s/ Mark W. Olson_______________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of September, 2016, served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing
an electronic copy to:
GREG S. SILVEY
SILVEY LAW OFFICE, LTD.
at the following email address: greg@idahoappeals.com.

MWO/dd

__/s/ Mark W. Olson____________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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